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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW
By QUINCY WRIGHT*
T IS not the writer's purpose to illustrate the system of in-
ternational law by instances of its observance or violation
since August, 1914. This would require much more space than
he has at disposal and has been well done in the recent volumes
by Professor Garner.1 He hopes rather, to make a preliminary
effort toward stating the effect of the war on the international laNv
of peace, war and neutrality, though with full realization that
the time is not yet ripe for an adequate statement. The present
article deals with the law of peace.
THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Writers generally hold that international law is founded on
agreement and reason.2 Agreement may be tacit, evidenced by
practice which in time becomes usage. If adhered to from a
sense of legal obligation, usage becomes custom which is a source
of law.3 No practice can become undoubted custom in so short
a time as six years. Thus we will not be justified in assuming
that war practices have modified the law, though they may indi-
cate a growing usage.
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
1J. W. Garner, International Law and the World War, 2 vols., Lon-
don, 1920.
2"International law, as understood among civilized nations, may be
defined as consisting of those rules of conduct which reason deduces, as
consonant to justice, from the nature of the society existing among inde-
pendent nations; with such definitions and modifications as may be estab-
lished by general consent." Wheaton, Elements of International Law,
Dana, ed., p. 23. See also Westlake, International Law, Cambridge, 1910,
1: 14. Grotius denominated that part of international law founded on
agreement "jus gentium" and that part founded on reason "jus natu-
rale," (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Prolegomena, secs. 1, 41), while Vattel
called that part founded on agreement "le droit des gens positif" divided
according as agreement is presumed, express, or tacit into "droit volon-
taire, conventionnel, et coutumier," and that part founded on reason
"droit des gens naturel ou necessaire." (Le Droit des Gens, Preliminaires,
sec. 27.) See Oppenheim, International Law, 3rd ed., London, 1920, sees.
54, 57, on the division of the "Grotians" into two schools, "the natural-
ists" and "the positivists" pinning their faith respectively on reason and
agreement. He notes that during the nineteenth century the positivists
tended to gain the upper hand. (Sec. 59.)
3 Oppenheim, op. cit., sec. 17.
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Agreement may also be express, evidenced informally by ex-
change of notes or formally by treaties and conventions. Only
formal agreements are sufficiently permanent to constitute a
source of international law. The peace treaties introduce certain
novelties into the system of international law and with them we
shall be concerned.4 It must be remembered, however, that treaty
provisions are international law, only for the states that have
ratified the treaty, and that several important states, including
Russia, Mexico and the United States, have not ratified any por-
tion of the peace treaties. The states which were neutral during
the war have for the most part acceded to the portions of the
peace treaties most affecting international law, those establishing
a League of Nations.'
Natural reason operates as a source of law. Those rules and
principles which in the opinion of a legally trained mind must
be observed if the existing international society is to persist are
valid law.6 Put in another way, we may say that assuming cer-
tain fundamental purposes of the family of nations, those prin-
ciples and rules which are necessary for securing them are law.
It is true that certain text writers deny the validity of this
source of international law,7 but nevertheless diplomats and
courts of arbitration appeal to reason,8 even more often than to
4The Treaty of Versailles with Germany, (June 28, 1919), the Treaty
of St. Germain with Austria (Sept. 10, 1919), the Treaty of Neuilly with
Bulgaria (Nov. 27, 1919), and the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary (June
4, 1920), each contains the League of Nations Covenant as the first 26
articles, as does presumably the Treaty of S~vres with Turkey (Aug. 10,
1920), though the latter has been neither ratified nor published. Peace
treaties have also been concluded by the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers with Poland (Versailles, June 28, 1919), Czecho-Slovakia (St.
Germain, Sept. 10, 1919), the Serb-Croat-Slovene State (St. Germain,
Sept. 10, 1919) and Roumania (Paris, Dec. 9, 1919). All of these treaties
except that of S~vres have been printed in full in the Supplements to the
American Journal of International Law from July, 1919, to Jan. 1921.
The Treaty of Versailles has also been published in the Naval War Col-
lege, International Law Documents, 1919, with a convenient index. An
index has also been published by the British government as Treaty Series
(1920) No. 1. Official publications with French and English texts in paral-
lel columns have been issued by the French, British and United States
governments, the latter as Sen. Doc. No. 85, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., and
in English text alone as Sen. Doc. No. 49, ibid.5Supra note 49.6Westlake, op. cit. 1: 14-15.
7Oppenheim, op. cit., sees. 15, 59; Hall, International Law, 7th ed.,
(Higgins), pp. 1-2.
$As examples see belligerent arguments for right of retaliation even
though adversely affecting neutrals in German note, February 16, 1915,
and British Memorandum, April 24, 1916, sec. 38, (Department of State,
European War, 1: 57, 3: 77) and neutral reply in U. S. note, April 21,
1915, (Ibid. 1: 74-75). Mr. Carter's argument for the United States in
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custom, treaty and authority in the practical determination of
legal controversies.9 According to Bonfils :10
"Public international law proposes to reach a compromise be-
tween two actions, contrary in fact, that of the principle of
autonomy of states, and that of the notion of the cosmopolitan
society. Neither of these two principles ought to supplant the
other, nor to be put completely to its practical application."
With this conception of the ultimate purpose of international
law there seems to be substantial agreement among the writers:"
and there is no reason to believe that the war has altered it. Still
there is the ideal of national independence. Still there is the ideal
of a world society. We may assume the same fundamental princi-
ples of international law, though doubtless the experience of
the war has shown that a change of emphasis from rights to re-
sponsibilities is necessary to maintain them, and that new con-
ditions caused by inventions, in means of communication and
transport, new instruments of warfare, and the more complete
organization of populations for war have rendered former de-
the Behring Sea Arbitration of 1893 is largely based on pure reason.
(1 Moore, International Arbitrations, 827 et seq.)9 Since diplomats usually accept without question rules of law well
established by precedent, treaty or authority, controversies in practice
frequently hinge on points to sustain which reason plays a prominent part.
See Lawrence, Principles of International Law, sec. 10.
1OBonfils, Manuel de droit international public, 6th ed., (Fauchille)
Paris, 1912, sec. 24, p. 10.
""Both schools [national or negative, and cosmopolitan or positive]
profess to be advocates of peace, which the negative school hopes to
realize by the principle of absolute non-intervention; the positive school
by the principle of international organization carried to the extent of
regulating national as well as international legislation; whilst the 'peace
party,' rushing from the one extreme to the other, attempts to draw water
at both wells. But whilst hopelessly conflicting in isolation, these two
schools, when combined, become complementary; and it is their recon-
ciliation, by the vindication of national freedom of action, not apart from,
but in and through the recognition of international dependence, which
constitutes the still very imperfectly solved problem of international law."
(1 Lorimer, Institutes of the Law of Nations, London, 1883, 11.) Writers
have often sought to reconcile these two aims of international law by a
rule closely resembling that posited by the individualistic school of ethics.
Thus Vattel says: "A nation is therefore free to act as it pleases, so far
as its acts do not affect the perfect rights of another Nation" (op. cit.
Prelim. sec. 20), and Westlake thinks: "International rules ought to be
made with due care that they shall not restrict liberty more than is neces-
sary" (op. cit. 1: 18). With these compare Spencer: "Every man may
claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the pos-
session of like liberty by every other man." (Social Statics, chap. 4,
sec. 3.) See also Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 14; Thomasius, Fundamenta
juris naturae et gentium ex sensu communi deducta, ed. 1718, p. 213,
cited Lorimer, Institutes of Law, Edinburgh, 1872, p. 232; Kant, Principles
of Political Right, (Trans. Hastie, 1891), p. 36, and The Philosophy of
Law, (Tran. Hastie, 1887) p. 45, referred to Spencer, Justice, 1891,
Appdx. A, and Wright, The Enforcement of International Law, U. of
Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 5: 21-22.
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ductions obsolete and have made necessary a re-xamination of
many detailed rules.
Reason, as a source of law, may also be formalized in the
writings of preEminent scholars.12 The rules deduced from prin-
ciple and crystallized in the texts of Grotius, Vattel, Wheaton,
Bonfils, Hall, etc., rest on the same authority now that they did
seven years ago. This source of law has not been affected by the
war. It probably will increase our confidence in these writers
to observe the justness of some of their forecasts. Hall writes
in the preface of his third edition in 1889:13
"Looking back over the last couple of centuries we see inter-
national law at the close of each fifty years in a more solid posi-
tion than that which it occupied at the beginning of the period.
• . . It would be idle to pretend that Europe is not now in
great likelihood moving towards a time at which the strength of
international law will be too hardly tried. Probably in the next
great war the questions which have accumulated during the last
half century and more, will all be given their answers at once.
Some hates moreover will crave for satisfaction; much envy and
greed will be at work; but above all, and at the bottom of all,
there will be the hard sense of necessity. Whole nations will
be in the field; the commerce of the world may be on the sea to
win or lose; national existences will be at stake; men will be
tempted to do anything which will shorten hostilities and tend to
a decisive issue. Conduct in the next great war will certainly
be hard; it is very doubtful if it will be scrupulous, whether on
the part of belligerents or neutrals; and most likely the next war
will be great. But there can be very little doubt that if the next
war is unscrupulously waged, it also -will be followed by a reac-
tion towards greater stringency of law. . . . I therefore look
forward with much misgiving to the manner in which the next
great war will be waged, but with no misgiving at all as to the
character of the rules which will be acknowledged ten years after
its termination, by comparison with the rules now considered
to exist."
While custom and authority, by which the major part of
international law is firmly established, have not changed during
the war, the peace treaties and reason guided by recent experi-
ence may inform us what tendencies of international law have
been most stimulated by occurrences of the past six years.
12For classic statements of the authority of text writers in interna-
tional law see Wheaton, op. cit. sec. 15, and Kent, Commentaries, 18,
cited with approval by Gray, J., in the Paquette Habana, (1899) 175
U. S. 677, 44 L. Ed. 320, 20 S. C. R. 290.
13Hall, International Law, 7th ed., pp. xx-xxi.
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THE SANCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
On December 28, 1915, Mr. Elihu Root called the attention
of the American Society of International Law to the serious
effect which the war then raging was having upon the very foun-
dations of international law.1 4
"Whether or not" he said, "Sir Edward Carson went too far
in his recent assertion that the law of nations has been destroyed
it is manifest that the structure has been rudely shaken."
"The barriers that statesmen and jurists have been construct-
ing laboriously for three centuries to limit and direct the conduct
of nations toward each other, in conformity to the standards of
modern civilization, have proved too weak to confine the tremen-
dous forces liberated by a conflict which involves almost the
whole military power of the world and in which the destinies of
nearly every civilized state outside the American continents are
directly at stake. . . . For the present, at all events in all
matters which affect the existing struggle, international law is
greatly impaired."
With a retrospect of two years since the armistice can we
qualify this interpretation of then present events?
It must be evident that to enumerate violations of the rules
and principles of international law during the war and since,
however disconcerting to the student and disturbing to the faith
of the layman, is not to demonstrate the death or even the deca-
dence of that body of law. Until the law has had a sufficient
opportunity to react with appropriate remedies and punishments,
whether by conscious judgments or natural consequences, we are
not entitled to proclaim its obsequies. If the remedy is complete,
the violation may ultimately demonstrate the vitality of the law.
"International laws violated with impunity" continues MVr. Root,
"must soon cease to exist," but international laws violated with
disaster may be strengthened. Yet with due consideration to the
remedies which have been exacted, the punishments which have
been meted out, the Nemesis which in many cases has followed
illegal action, it must be admitted that serious grounds exist for
questioning the sufficiency of the sanctions of international law.
We may investigate the progress made toward fulfillment of Mr.
Root's prophecy that:
"Vague and uncertain as the future must be, there is some
reason to think that after the terrible experience through which
14The Outlook for International Law, Proceedings, Ninth Annual meet-
ing, American Society of International Law, 1915, p. 2. See also Munroe
Smith, The Nature and the Future of International Law, Presidential
address American Political Science Association, Dec. 28, 1917, Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 12:8.
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civilization is passing there will be a tendency to strengthen rather
than abandon the law of nations."
International law is doubtless sanctioned in part by inertia
and habit.15 Nations do as they have done because they lack orig-
inality to think of something new. So far as international law
is observed for this reason alone it resembles the scientist's "law
of nature." It is merely a generalization of past practice and
can not be violated, because a new departure merely changes the
law. So far as law is of this character it is descriptive and not
formative. As civilization has advanced and states have become
more self' conscious, their allegiance to habit has become less.
The experience of the war has shown that the highly organized
states of today do not blindly follow custom when important in-
terests are at stake. Mere inertia is not likely in the future to
prevent rapid changes in the law.
If, leaving the scientist, we follow the humanist and conceive
of law as a guide for the conduct of intelligent beings, we find
that law which changes rapidly is not law at all. Law from the
humanist's point of view must be a permanent standard by which
conduct can be measured. What is it that induces nations to
conform their conduct to international law? Austin called inter-
national law "international public morality" and asserted that it
was sanctioned only by the moral sense of nations. 6 Others,
though denying its exclusiveness, have considered the moral sanc-
tion important.'" Hobbes and Grotius called the performance of
covenants a fundamental "law of nature,' 1 8 and others have as-
serted that respect for the obligations of contract is elementary
in morals, and the sine qua non of all society,' 9 yet the war began
15This is in varying degree true of all law. Maine speaks of a stage
"in the infancy of mankind" when "law has scarcely reached the footing
of custom; it is rather a habit." Ancient Law, p.-8.
161 Austin, Jurisprudence, 173, 226. See also 2 Stephen, History of
the Criminal Law, 25; Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, sec. 285.
'.Grotius, op. cit. Prolegomena, secs. 6-8; Vattel, op. cit. Prelimi-
naires, sec. 7. "They (rules of international law) are enforced partly by
a conscientious conviction that they are good and right." Lawrence, The
Principles of International Law, sec. 9.
IsHobbes, Leviathan, chap. 15; Grotius, op. cit. Proleg., sec. 15. Thejurist's "law of nature" is of course different from the scientist's "law
of nature." See Lorimer, Institutes of Law, Introduction; Maine, Ancient
Law, chap. iv; Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, chap. xi.
'9"Fundamentum justitiae est fides, id est dictorum conventorumque
constantia et veritas." (Cicero, de Off., 1: 9.) "Pour donner quelque
consistance au moral et quelque sfiret6 aux nations il faut supposer, par
pr~f6rance A tout le reste, deux points qui sont comme les deux p6les de
]a terre enti~re: l'un que tout trait6 de paix jur6 entre deux princes est
inviolable a leur 6gard." (Directions pour le Conscience d'un Roi, 6 Fen-
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by the conversion of a treaty to a scrap of paper,20 continued
with repeated accusations of treaty repudiation 2' and ended by
allegations of a breach of the agreement on which the enemy laid
down his arms, in the opinion of some by the states which rati-
fied the treaty of Versailles, 22 and, in the opinion of others, by the
state which refused to ratify.2 3 Machiavelli denied that nations
had any morals and was followed in effect by Frederick the
Great and Treitschke .2  Though few accept this harsh conclu-
sion we may question whether, in view of recent experience the
world would not be naive to rely on the conscience of nations
as a guarantee of international law where important national
interests are at stake.2
5
elon, Oeuvres, 319, ed., 1810.) "A treaty-breaking state is the great.
enemy of nations, the. destroyer of their happiness, the obstacle of their
progress." (2 Phillimore, Commentary on International Law, 57.) "A
cardinal maxim of justice in all its forms, whether between man and
man, or between nation and nation is the maxim, 'keep faith.'" (Creasy,
First Platform of International Law, p. 40.) See also Hall, op. cit. p. 360.
2OSir Edward Goshen, British Ambassador at Berlin thus reports his
interview with Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg on August 4, 1914: "I
found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a
harangue which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step
taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a
word--'neutrality'-a word which in war had so often been disregarded-
just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a
kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her."
British Parl. Pap., Misc. No. 8, 1914; Garner, op. cit. 2: 192.21See for example Austrian comment on Italian repudiation of the
Triple Alliance, (Baron Burian, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister to
the Duke of Avarna, Italian Ambassador, May 21, 1915, Italian Green
Book, No. 77) and United States comment on the German repudiation
of "solemn assurance" to discontinue submarine warfare (Secretary of
State Lansing to Ambassador Gerard, Feb. 3, 1917, U. S. Dept. of State,
European War, 4: 409.) See also U. S. comment on German violations
of the treaty of 1828, Ibid., 4: 417. Charges by both belligerents of vio-
lation of the conventional law of war were of almost daily occurrence.
See especially protests against violations of the Geneva convention by
both belligerents and by. the International Committee of the Red Cross
Society at Geneva, Garner, op. cit. chap. xx, and p. 512.2 2See Observations of the German delegation on the Conditions of
Peace, May 29, 1919, Official Summary, printed in Sen. Doc., No. 149,
66th Cong., 1st Sess., and printed in full, International Conciliation, Oct.
1919, No. 143. See also, Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the
Peace, N. Y. 1920, pp. 60-65.
234 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw, 35.
24Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. 18; Treitschke, Politics, (Eng. Trans.,
N. Y. 1916), chap. 3.
2 5Examples of a cynical attitude toward treaties have not been want-
ing in the past. "Then the astonished Dutchmen asked, if the Hudson
River belonged to the King of England, in what light was the treaty of
Hartford to be regarded. As mere waste paper, was the reply; it had
never been ratified by any governing authority in England whether par-
liament, Lord Protector, or King." (1 Fiske, The Dutch and Quaker Col-
onies, ed. 1902, 327, with reference to treaty of Sept. 19, 1650.) "Treaties
at best are but complied with so long as interest requires their fulfill-
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But if nations will not observe law from the promptings of
conscience, will they not from an understanding of its utility?
"Natural Law," says Grotius, "is reinforced by utility."
ment; consequently they are virtually binding on the weaker part only,
or in plain truth they are not binding at all." (Irving, Knickerbocker
History of New York, book 5, chap. 4.) "Two centuries ago Spinoza
had avowed what Mackintosh terms 'the absurd and detestable maxim'
that states are not bound to observe their treaties longer than while the
interest or danger which first formed the treaties continues, but this
doctrine had, until lately, found few advocates in theory." (Creasy,
First Platform of International Law, London, 1876, p. 41.) "In a recent
historical work, Jdger's History of the Franco-Prussian war, I read
the following passage, which is evidently intended to annihilate me:
'Only a very narrow-minded politician could wonder that Prussia seized
that moment (1870) for breaking the treaty.' (Of Paris 1856 neutral-
izing the Black Sea). The historian probably did not contemplate the
application of that principle to Alsace." (2 von Beust, Memoirs, Eng.
Trans., London, 1887, 222.) "Did any impartial person blame Prussia
or Austria because, in 1813, they violated the treaties which bound them
to the first Napoleon, and not only did not fight in his ranks, as their
engagements required, but brought their whole military force into the
field against him, and pursued him to his destruction? . . . Yet it
was as true of those treaties as it is of the treaty of 1856, that, disad-
vantageous and dishonorable as they might be, they had been submitted
to as the purchase-money of peace, when the prolongation of war would
have been most disastrous. . . . If, though not fit to be perpetual, (a
treaty) has been imposed in perpetuity, the question when it becomes
right to throw it off is but a question of time. No time having been
fixed, Russia fixed her own time, and naturally chose the most con-
venient. She had no reason to believe that the release she sought would
be voluntarily granted on any conditions which she would accept; and
she chose an opportunity which, if not seized, might have been long
before it occurred again, when the other contracting parties were in a
more than usually disadvantageous position for going to war." (J. S.
Mill, Treaty Obligations, Fortnightly Review, N. S. 1870, p. 715). "All
contracts between great states cease to be unconditionally binding, as
soon as they are tested by 'the struggle for existence.' No great nation
will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to
contract when it is compelled to choose between the two." (2 Bismarck
Reflections and Reminiscences, London, 1898, 270). "A great nation does
not surrender what it possesses except under the pressure of extreme
necessity; all treaties making concessions are acknowledgements of such
a necessity, not moral obligations. If every people justly reckons it a
point of honour to tear to pieces by force of arms treaties that are dis-
graceful, how could honour enjoin patient adherence to a convention like
the Caudine to which an unfortunate general was morally compelled,
while the sting of the recent disgrace was keenly felt and the vigour
of the nation subsisted unimpaired?" (1 Mommsen, History of Rome, Bk.
2, chap. 6, Dickson's Trans., 377) "We must beware of judging a great
crisis from the advocates' Philistine standpoint. When Prussia broke
the Treaty of Tilsit the civil law would have pronounced her wrong,
but who would dare assert that she was guilty now? Not the French
themselves. This applies to international treaties less devoid of all
morality than that which Prussia was compelled to conclude with
France. Every state reserves to itself the right to be judge of its own
treaties, and the historian must not condemn, without searching deeper
to discover whether it is fulfilling its unqualified duty of self-mainte-
nance." (Treitschke, Politics, English Trans. 1916, 1: 96.) See also Ber-
nard, Lectures on Diplomacy, London, 1868, p. 85; 5 Moore, International
Law Digest, 338-341.
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"As a citizen," he continues, "who violates the civil law for
the sake of present utility, destroys that institution in which the
perpetual utility of himself and his posterity is bound up; so too
a people which violates the laws of nature and nations, beats
down the bulwark of its own tranquillity for future time. '2
To the same effect says Vattel :27
"The laws of the natural society of nations are so important
to the welfare of every state that if the habit should prevail of
treading them underfoot no nation could hope to protect its ex-
istence or its domestic peace, whatever wise and just and temper-
ate measures it might take."
War, however, is itself the negation of society. Whatever
may be said of the international law of peace, can the law of war
be sanctioned by utility? It would seem that if the law of war
is of such character that violations inevitably react disastrously
upon the violator, it would be well sanctioned. The war witnessed
the working of this nemesis. Illegalities led to reprisals, atro-
cities stimulated recruiting, disregard for the fundamental rights
of neutrals made neutrals enemies. The history of the war is full
of evidence that violation of the law of war does not pay in
the long run.28
If violation of international law is inevitably against the long
run interest of the violator, then further enlightenment is the
only need, for the lives of states are long. They can afford to
forego a present advantage for a sure though distant gain.
Machiavellian statesmen and ruthless generals need instruction
as to the inevitable consequences of their acts rather than per-
suasion to be good. This may be true but the nemesis may be
far off. Even enlightened statesmen may be skeptical of its in-
evitableness." The war has not increased confidence in en-
lightened self-interest as a sanction for international law.
The sanction of municipal law is the force of organized so-
ciety which quickens reason by making certain and swift the
consequences of violation of law, otherwise slow and vague. 0
Only by organization has positive law been maintained within the
2 Grotius, op. cit. Proleg., secs. 16, 18.
27Vattel, op. cit. Prelim. sec. 22.2sSee Garner on effect of devastation, op. cit. 1: 322; on effect of
air raids, 1: 488; on effect of deportations, 2:184 and Kellogg on effect
of terrorism, Atlantic Monthly, 122: 289, (Sept. 1918) Garner is of the
opinion that collective fines were effective in attaining their immediate
object, 2: 362.29We may recall the Socratic paradox, that though Virtue is Knowl-
edge, yet Virtue can not like Knowledge be taught. Plato, Protagoras
and Meno.3ORoot, op. cit. Proc. Am. Soc. of Int. Law, 1915, pp. 4-5.
THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
state. Anarchists alone have sufficient confidence in human na-
ture to advocate an abandonment of police and courts, substi-
tuting therefor a reliance upon moral sense and enlightened self-
interest. Is philosophical anarchy more likely to be successful
outside of the state? Writers on international law have thought
not and have asserted the necessity of conscious sanctions. Pub-lic opinion has been defended as a sufficient sanction."' The
reality of its pressure is evident by the anxiety which belliger-
ents showed to justify their acts before the world, but it has notproved sufficient in the face of determined policies of aggression.
The conviction growing from the war, that international law
must be better sanctioned was realized in the peace treaties by
the more definite organization of the family of nations in a
League. Although compulsory settlement of legal controversies
is not provided for, yet all controversies must be submitted to
either conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement (art. 12)
under penalty of economic and military coercion by the League,(art. 16) and if submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement
the award becomes enforceable by the League (art. 13). The
financial liability of states (art. 231) and the penal liability ofindividuals for violations of the law of war (art. 228) was also
definitely recognized by the treaty of Versailles.
I
THE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A subject of international law has been defined as one "upon
whom [international] law confers rights and imposes duties."'
This does not, however, adequately distinguish between subjects
and objects of international law. Thus Westlake says "it would
be pedantic to deny that the pirate and the blockade runner are
subjects of international law"3 3 and Oppenheim's argument deny-
ing that status to such individuals as well as heads of states and
diplomatic officers seems to carry a suggestion of pedantry. 34
"If we look more closely into these rights, it becomes quite
obvious that they are not given to the favoured individual bythe law of nations directly. For how could international law,
which is a law between states, give rights to individuals, con-3
'Root, The Sanctions of International Law, 2 Am. Journ. of Int.Law, 451, (1908). Mr. Root himself, however, most clearly realized theinsufficiency of this sanction in the address of 1915 just referred to.32Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, N. Y.,1915, p. 16.33Westlake, Collected Papers on Public International Law, Cambridge,1914, p. 2.34Oppenheim, op. cit. 1: 457, 460.
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cerning their relations to a state? What the law of nations really
does concerning individuals is to impose the duty upon all the
members of the family of nations to grant certain privileges to
such foreign heads of states and diplomatic envoys, and certain
rights to such foreign citizens, as are on their territory. And,
corresponding to this duty, every state has by the law of nations
a right to demand that its head, its diplomatic envoys and its
citizens be granted certain rights by foreign states when on their
territory. Foreign states granting these rights to foreign indi-
viduals do this by their municipal laws, and these rights are,
therefore, not international rights, but* rights derived from mu-
nicipal laws."
Perhaps the discussion can be taken out of the realm of
metaphysics if we confine the term subjects of international law
to those entities which are competent to appeal directly to estab-
lished international processes for the enforcement of their rights
under international law. Recalling that international law con-
sists of those rules and principles for the violation of which
states are responsible, 35 we may conclude that subjects of inter-
national law include all entities, whether states, protectorates,
colonies, corporations, or individuals that can bring action by
some recognized and reasonably effective process against a state
(other than that of which it is a member or subject) to remedy
an alleged violation of its rights. Thus to determine what en-
tities at any given time are subjects of international law we must
examine the condition of international organization. As Bor-
chard points out,36 the international prize court provided by the
XII Hague convention of 1907, if established would have made
individuals to a limited extent subjects of international law since
it afforded them recourse against belligerent states alleged to have
violated their rights on the high seas. The practice of diplo-
matic protection of citizens abroad does not, however, render in-
dividual subjects of international law, because although their
rights and duties are measured by international law, yet they have
no recourse except by the grace of their government.
3 7  If,
however, an international court for the settlement of pecuniary
claims were established giving direct recourse to individuals with
claims against foreign governments, such persons would become,
in so far, subjects of international law. 38 Whether the recourse
35Wright, The Enforcement of International Law, p. 13.
3GBorchard, op. cit. p. 17.
37Ibid., pp. 356, 363.
38Such a court has often been recommended. Borchard op. cit. pp.
328, 373, 443, 864; Wright, 12 Am. Journ. Int. Law, 89.
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against the state offered to aliens in national courts applying in-
ternational law, such as prize courts, renders such aliens sub-jects of international law raises a much discussed question. But
in view of the ultimate subordination of such courts to national
legislation we must answer in the negative. 39
The most important subjects of international law are sov-
ereign states, which have recourse against other states by diplo-
macy, arbitration, reprisals or war. Since the beginning of the
world war the number of sovereign states has been increased.
Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Finland, and the Hedjaz have been gen-
erally recognized and admitted to the League of Nations. Aus-
tria-Hungary has ceased to exist, its two components, reduced in
area, have been recognized as independent states. Montenegro
seems to have united with Serbia and much former Austrian ter-
ritory to form the Serb-Croat-Slovene state commonly called
Jugo-Slavia.40 From the former territory of Russia and Tur-
key a number of de facto states have grown up, some of which
may ultimately receive general recognition. In this class are
Lithuania, Esthonia, Latvia, Ukrainia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ar-
menia, the Far Eastern Republic and various other governments
in Siberia.41
There has also been a change in the condition of certain states
under special status. Belgium and Luxemburg have been re-
lieved of the neutralization imposed by the treaties of 1839 and
1867 respectively. Luxemburg still regards herself as neutralized
by internal legislation but has agreed to alter this legislation so
as to conform with requirements of the League of Nations Cove-
nant including the duty to permit the passage of troops author-
ized by the League.42 Switzerland continues under the neutral-
ization created by the Treaty of 1815 and the League of Nations
has recognized her exemption from any obligation "to take part
39Borchard, op. cit. p. 17; Wright, The Enforcement of InternationalLaw, pp. 15-17, 223-228; The Zamora, L. R. [1916] 2 A. C. 77.4 0A useful list of the states of the world is given in Oppenheim, op.
cit. 1: 188.41The first seven named applied for admission to the League ofNations at the meeting of the Assembly, Dec., 1920. Though this wasrefused the three Baltic States and Armenia were admitted to partici-pation in the technical organizations of the League. In view of thehopes of Armenia, Lord Rebert Cecil, representative from South Africa,thought this was "to offer not a stone in place of bread but rather apuff of smoke." (League of Nations Assembly, Provisional VerbatimRecord, 27th Plenary Session, Dec. 16, 1920, pp. 11-12.)42Treaty of Versailles, art. 31, 40. League of Nations Assembly,
op. cit. 26th Plenary Session, Dec. 16, 1920, p. 6.
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in any military action or to allow the passage of foreign troops
or the preparation of military operations within her territory."
43
This exemption is not in reality a reservation since the Treaty
of Versailles of which the League of Nations Covenant is a part
itself recognizes the special status of Switzerland.
44 Albania
was neutralized under the protection of an international com-
mission of control on gaining her independence in 1913.
45 Her
status at present, however, appears to be that of a sovereign state
and as such she has been admitted to the League of Nations.
46
The treaties have given formal sanction to the distinction long
existent in fact between great powers and other states.
4 7 The
United States of America, The British Empire, France, Italy,
and Japan, designated the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
in the treaties are recognized in the former class and if mem-
bers of the League of Nations are accorded permanent member-
ship in the Council (art. 4). Germany, Austria and Russia on
the other hand have ceased for the time being at least to be
"great powers."
States members of the League of Nations occupy a special
status under the treaties and this status affects not only their rela-
tions among each other but also their relations with states not
members of the League. Thus member states are guaranteed
against violation Qf their territorial integrity and existing political
independence by outsiders (Art. X), and may enlist the aid of
the League to compel outsiders to submit controversies to peace-
ful settlement (Art. XVII). The League of Nations at present
has forty-seven members, thus including all recognized sovereign
states except Germany, Hungary, Turkey, Russia, United States,
Mexico, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Monaco, and Lichtenstein. The
43League of Nations, Official Journal, (1920) 2: 58.
44Art. 435. Furthermore, Swiss neutralization is an "international
engagement . . . for securing the maintenance of peace" and so is
expressly recognized by Art. 21 of the Covenant. See Swiss Official
Commentary, printed in the League of Nations, World Peace Founda-
tion, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 151-152, (June, 1920). See also Message of Swiss
Federal Council to the Federal Assembly, Feb. 17, 1920, International
Conciliation, No. 152, pp. 321, 325, (July, 1920).
45Mehemed Bey Konitza, The Albanian Question, reprinted from the
Adriatic Review, International Conciliation, No. 138, p. 767, (May, 1919).
Sayre, Experiments in International Administration, N. Y. 1919, pp. 56-59.
46League of Nations Assembly, op. cit. 28th Plen. Sess., Dec. 17,
1920, pp. 3-10.
47Lawrence, Principles of International Law, secs. 113-115. Dickin-
son, The Equality of States in International Law, Cambridge, 1920. Chap.
VIII. Oppenheim, op. cit. sec. 116 denies that there is a difference in
legal status.
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protectorates of Andorra, San Marino, Iceland, Danzig, Egypt,
Tunis, Morocco, Mongolia and Thibet are not members of theLeague of Nations though their protecting powers are in each
case members. 48 On the other hand, five self-governing and par-
tially self-governing colonies of the British Empire, Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, South Africa and India are full members of
the League and have therefore become subjects of international
law.4
9
The League of Nations is itself an entity which can enterinto direct relations with outside states as well as its members
and is therefore a subject of international law. As Oppenheim
emphasizes, it "is in every respect an international person suigeneris, something not to be likened to anything else, for it is
neither a state nor a federal state (Bundesstaat), not a confed-
eration of states (Staatenbund), nor a mere alliance." o
Although the treaties accord special rights and privileges topeoples under a mandatory, and to individuals, racial minorities
and national groups in various East European States, and al-
though the League of Nations guarantees these rights and priv-ileges, " ' these entities have not been made subjects of interna-
tional law. None of these individuals, racial minorities or na-
tional groups have a direct method of enforcing there rights andprivileges but must in each case get an independent state to cham-
pion their cause. Thus the Roumanian treaty provides :52
"Roumania agrees that any member of the Council of theLeague of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention
of the council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any
of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon takesuch action and give such direction as it may deem proper and
effective in the circumstances."
Though article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant recog-
nizes that "the wishes of these communities [to be put under
class A mandates] must be a principal consideration in the selec-
tion of the mandatory" it makes no provision for appeal by rep-48For list of states and protectorates with discussion of their status,
see 1 Oppenheim, 167, 188.
49Annex to Art. 26, League of Nations Covenant, Oppenheim, op. cit.1:170; and Allin, 4 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, 117, 190, (Jan. Feb. 1920).These Colonies have access to the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice, 14 Supp. Am. Journ. of Int. Law, 378.50Oppenheim, op. cit. 1: 269.
5"League of Nations, Official Journal, 1920, 2: 55-56.
-
52Art. 12, 14 Supp. Am. Journ. Int. Law, 329. Similar provisions arein the treaties with Poland (art. 12), Czecho-Slovakia (art. 14), and theSerb-Croat-Slovene State (art. 11).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
resentatives of these communities to any organ of the League.
The mandatory power and not the people under the mandate
makes an annual report to the mandate commission.
Furthermore, although the principle of national self-deter-
mination was applied in arranging boundaries in the enemy ter-
ritory,53 and though plebiscites were provided for in several re-
gions,5 1 yet unrecognized national groups were not in any sense
accorded a status under international law. They may, however,
appeal to the League of Nations by persuading a member state to
champion their cause. Thus Article XI of the Covenant de-
clares it "to be the friendly right of each member of the League
to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any
circumstances whatever affecting international relations which
threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding
between nations upon which peace depends." Sir Frederick Pol-
lock says, with reference to international consideration of the
Irish question :
"There is only one way in which this could happen, namely
that the government of the United States should declare Irish-
American sympathy with unsatisfied nationalist claims in Ire-
land to be capable of disturbing good understanding between
Great Britain and the United States. That is a possible event 
if
a solution is not reached within a reasonable time, but it is more
likely that a confidential intimation from the United States would
not only precede formal reference to the Council but avoid the
necessity for it."
The Permanent Court of International Justice authorized by
article XIV of the League of Nations Covenant and provided 
for
in detail by the Geneva meeting of the Assembly is "open of right"
only to the states mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant, 
and
to such others as shall subsequently enter the League of Nations.
"Other states" may, however, "have access to it" under 
condi-
tions determined by the Council of the League.
56 No provision
is made, as in the Central American court of justice in effect from
1907 to 1917 and in the proposed International Prize Court, 
for
suits begun by private individuals.
53Haskins and Lord, Some Problems of the Peace Conference, Cam-
bridge, 1920, pp. 19-20.
54Schleswig, Allenstein, Marienwerder, Silesia, Saar Valley, Eupen,
Malmedy, Teschen, Zips, Arva, and Klagenfurt. See Haskins and 
Lord,
op. cit. under these names in index.
5SPollock, The League of Nations, p. 131. This statement assumes
that the United States is a member of the League.
5614 Supp. Am. Jour. Int. Law, 378.
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Thus the essential subjects of international law are still sov-
ereign states, although the implications of sovereignty have been
somewhat modified. The League of Nations unquestionably tends
to decrease the rights and powers of its members and to increase
their obligations and responsibilities, with the purpose, however,
of better securing those rights and of enlarging the capacity of
each to exercise its powers.
"By accepting the League, states recognize that their exist-
ence depends upon the general maintenance of law, and conse-quently that they must prefer the claim of that law for defense,
as against the lure of an immediate national profit.5 7 Thus,though international law will continue to aim at'preserving theindependence and autonomy of states, it must be assumed that its
own preservation is more important. It follows that internationallaw can no longer be conceived by text writers as a series of de-ductions from an assumed fundamental right of states to exist.The responsibility of states to assure the existence of the law
will have to be conceived as even more -fundamental.' ' 5 7
THE OBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The extent to which states can actually exercise their subjec-
tive sovereignty can be ascertained by examining their jurisdic-
tion or the control which they in fact exercise over material things,
called by Oppenheim "the objects of international law" and class-
ifiable as territory, individuals and the high seas. 8 The dom-
inating conception of international law since the peace of West-
phalia has been that territory must be under the exclusive and
complete jurisdiction of one state.5 9 Conditions of joint juris-
diction and partial jurisdiction have been rare.60 The principle
of exclusive and complete territorial jurisdiction is recognized in
the League of Nations Covenant by the guarantee of "territorial
integrity" and "existing political independence" to members of
the League (Art. X) and by the exclusion from consideration in
the Council or Assembly of disputes "arising out of a matter
which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdic-
tion" of either party (Art. XV, par. 8). However, the treaties
contain a number of specific exceptions to this principle. Thus
a number of rivers of Europe are put under control of inter-
5 7Wright, 13 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., 556, (Nov., 1919).5sOppenheim, op. cit. Part II, sec. 290.59M1aine, Ancient Law. pp. 103-112; Westlake, Collected Papers, pp.133-134; Hall, op. cit. p. 19; Borchard, op. cit. pp. 3-6; Wright, Enforce-
ment of International Law, p. 21.60See 1 Cobbett, Leading Cases in International Law, 110-116; Hicks,The New 'World Order, N. Y. 1920, pp. 185-192; Sayre, Experiments inInternational Administration, pp. 56, 79, 92.
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national commissions and are thus removed to a certain extent
from the jurisdiction of the states through which they flow. This
is by no means a new departure since the internationalization of
rivers and other means of transport has been provided by treaties
since 1815.61 The internationalization of two areas of territory,
Dantzig and the Saar valley, is a more novel experiment. These
areas are under a virtual protectorate of the League of Nations,
Dantzig permanently and the Saar valley for fifteen years, at
which time a plebiscite will be taken on the question of mainte-
nance of the existing regime, union with France or union with
Germany.62 The system of colonial mandates contemplates a
limited jurisdiction by the mandatory power in the territory under
the mandate. The League of Nations Covenant itself states the
important limitations which the mandatory power must observe
in behalf of the native population and other members of the
League. These limitations will be specified in detail in the docu-
ment conferring the mandate which is exercised "in behalf of
the League" and is subject to the supervision of the Council act-
ing with the advice of a permanent mandatory commission (art.
22).63
Aside from these specific exceptions from the exclusive ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of certain states, several general principles
are accepted by parties to the treaties which limit their discre-
tion in matters hitherto regarded as domestic. These limitations,
it should be emphasized, are not detailed rules but general prin-
ciples which the states accept as a guide for future legislation and
treaty making. They relate to such matters as the regulation of
railroads and other means of transit (art. 23e),64 the protection
of racial and national minorities and native populations (art.
23b),15 the maintenance of labor standards, (art. 23a),
.6 the lim-
61licks, op. cit. pp. 192-197; Sayre, op. cit. pp. 38, 88, 131.62Treaty of Versailles, arts. 100-108; 46-47 and arts. 16-40 of annex
following art. 50. For organization of governments see League of
Nations Official Journal, 2: 45-55.63See also Memorandum of the Secretary General on Mandates, July
30, 1920; Reports of M. Hymans adopted by the Council, Aug. 5, 1920,
and Oct. 26, 1920, and Constitution of Permanent Mandates Commission
approved by the Council Dec. 1, 1920, printed as annexes 3, 4, 10, 14 in
League of Nations Assembly Document, No. 161, reprinted from League
of Nations Official Journal. See also Hicks, op. cit. pp. 176-185.64See also special regulations on German Railways, arts. 365-369,
372-374.
65Special treaties with Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, and the
Serb-Croat-Slovene state deal with this subject. Supra note 4.
66A special labor organization is set up by Part XIII of the Treaty
of Versailles, arts. 387-426, and a labor bill of rights is included as art.
427.
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itation of the white slave and opium traffic (art. 23c), the limita-
tion of armaments (art. 8),67 the control of arms traffic (art.
23d),8 s and the prevention of disease (art. 23f).
Second only in importance to the conception of exclusive and
complete territorial jurisdiction has been that of the complete
jurisdiction of a state over its citizens or nationals. The priv-
ileges guaranteed to natives in mandate territory by the League
of Nations can not be regarded as limiting the jurisdiction of
states over their nationals because these natives do not in reality
owe allegiance to the mandate power,6" but the similar privileges
guaranteed to racial and national minorities in certain states of
Eastern Europe is such a limitation, for which precedents may
be found in the treaty of Berlin, of 1878.0 The privilege ac-
corded in most cases to the inhabitants of transferred territory to
choose their nationality and to migrate is in accord with most
cession treaties of recent times. 7' The rights of labor (art. 23a)
and native races (art. 23b) stated as general principles in the
treaties would seem to somewhat limit the jurisdiction of the
contracting' states over their subjects. The doctrine of racial
equality proposed by Japan, and which if accepted in good faith
might have had a radical effect on the power of states to dis-
criminate in legislating for their nationals, was rejected.
The freedom of the seas or the absence of national jurisdiction
on the high seas in time of peace except over national vessels has
been accepted as international law since the controversies of Sel-
den and Grotius in the seventeenth century focussed the issue.
The United States has always been an ardent protagonist of free-
67German military, naval and air forces are reduced and subjected
to an interallied commission of control by Part V of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, arts. 159-213. "In order to render possible the initiation of a gen-
eral limitation of the armament of all nations Germany undertakes
strictly to observe" these clauses.
68A special treaty for the control of traffic in arms, signed by most
of the powers at St. Germain, Sept. 10, 1919, was endorsed by the League
of Nations assembly, 22nd Plenary Session, Dec. 14, 1920, p. 3.69"A mandatory on behalf of the League" does not enjoy sovereignty
over the inhabitants, though by art. 127 of the treaty of Versailles the
"native inhabitants of the former German oversea possessions shall be
entitled to the diplomatic protection of the Governments exercising au-
thority over those territories!'
70See guarantee of minority rights by treaty of Berlin in Bulgaria(arts. 5, 8), Montenegro (arts. 27, 30), Serbia (arts. 37, 39), Roumania(arts. 44, 50), and Turkey (arts. 41, 42). See recent treaties supra
note 65.71Treaty of Versailles, arts. 37, 85, 91, 106, 113. Full option of na-
tionality is not permitted in Alsace-Lorraine, Annex following art. 79
and art. 278. See also treaties supra note 65.
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dom of the seas asserting with success that it implies co6peration
for the suppression of pirates like the Barbary Corsairs, accept-
ance of the flag as prima facie evidence of the nationality of ves-
sels, and free access to landlocked seas through straits like the
Danish sounds. 72 The treaties increase freedom of the seas
in time of peace by assuring free access to the sea through inter-
nationalized rivers and ports.73 The objects for which a free
sea has been sought are also promoted by the guarantees for an
open door to members of the league in various undeveloped re-
gions (art. 22, 23e).
Freedom of the seas in time of war has been subject to such
varied interpretations that no assured meaning can be assigned
to the phrase. In law, however, it would seem to mean that bel-
ligerents may interfere with enemy and neutral navigation of the
high seas to the extent that international law permits and no
more. Controversy has arisen because the indefiniteness of the
law in this respect has left a wide margin for the play of national
policies. The belligerent assertion of maritime jurisdiction dur-
ing the war beyond that heretofore recognized, by the sowing of
mine fields, the proclamation of submarine war zones, the prac-
tice of routing and searching neutral vessels in port and the ex-
tension of the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockade aroused
neutral protest but was not dealt with by the treaty. The cove-
nant appears to contemplate an extreme use of commercial block-
ade in wars authorized by the League of Nations (art. 16) a
method in accord with President Wilson's second point.
74
In general the effect of the war on the objects of international
law has been to limit the exclusive and complete jurisdiction of
states over territory and persons. The interest of the family of
nations as organized in the League has been recognized with ref-
erence especially to means of transport and communication, the
72Moore, Principles of American Diplomacy, pp. 103-134; Schuyler,
American Diplomacy, N. Y. 1886, pp. 193-367.
73The Elbe, Oder, Niemen, and Danube are declared international
rivers for portions of their courses. (Art. 331.)
74The Second point of Jan. 8, 1918, suggested "Absolute freedom of
navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and
in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by inter-
national action for the enforcement of international covenants." In
accepting the fourteen points by a note of Nov. 5, 1918, the allies pointed
out that "clause two relating to what is usually described as the freedom
of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could
not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete free-
dom on this subject when they enter the peace conference."
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protection of peoples liable to oppression and the equality of op-
portunity for the exploitation of undeveloped regions.
TRANSACTIONS IN THE NORMAL RELATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw
International transactions are usually classified according as
they involve the relations of peace, war, or neutrality. Peace is
the normal relation of states; war and neutrality are abnormal
relations. The established instrumentalities for conducting nor-
mal international relations, foreign offices, diplomatic and con-
sular officers, have been added to by the various organs estab-
lished by the League of Nations. The Assembly and Council of
the League are quasi-diplomatic gatherings the members of which
enjoy the usual diplomatic privileges and immunities (Art. 7).
The Secretariat with its many technical divisions is a central
advisory and clerical organ, while such bodies as the mandates
commission (art. 22), the disarmament commission (art. 9), the
international labor office, (art. 393) etc., are given special super-
visorv functions. A permanent international court is authorized
by the Covenant (art. 14) and a detailed code organizing it and
defining its jurisdiction has been accepted by the assembly and
will be effective when ratified by the members of the League.7 5
These new organs, together with the bureaus of existing admin-
istrative unions coordinated under the supervision of the League
(art. 24) and the Hague bureau and permanent court of arbitra-
tion recognized by it (art. 13), will offer greatly improved facili-
ties for the transaction of international business and the settle-
ment of international controversies.
The most important peaceful transactions of states are the set-
tlement of controversies, the establishment of permanent regula-
tions and obligations, and the transfer of territory. In all of
these matters legal principles seem to be growing up which limit
the former complete liberty of the immediately interested states.
Thus members of the League of Nations are required to submit
controversies to the permanent court, to arbitration, or to concil-
iation by the Council or Assembly (art. 12), and states not in the
League are virtually compelled similarly to submit controversies
with League members (art. 17). In such cases the award of ar-
75League of Nations Assembly, op. cit. 21st Plen. Sess., Dec. 13, 1920,p. 13. For text submitted by the Council, which however was somewhat
modified by the Assembly see Supp. Am. Journ. Int. Law, 14: 371 (Oct.
1920).
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bitration or of the international court is enforceable by the League
(art. 13), while recommendations of the Council or Assembly
can not be enforced unless unanimous with exception of the par-
ties to the dispute (art. 15), though a delay of nine months from
submission must ensue before war can be resorted to (art. 12).
Thus the former liberty of states to settle their controversies by
force or self help is considerably impaired.
Permanent obligations and regulations are practically always
embodied in written documents called treaties or conventions, but
the value of these instruments depends upon the confidence of the
parties that they will be respected. Maintenance of a scrupulous
respect for treaty obligations, a principle approved in the London
Conference of 187176 and emphasized by its violation on the out-
break of war in 1914,7 7 is declared in the preamble to be one
object of the League of' Nations. To sanction this principle,
treaties entered into by members of the League do not become
bindifng until registered with the Secretariat which forthwith pub-
lishes them (art. 18). The members, however, agree not to make
treaties inconsistent with the League Covenant and to abrogate
such treaties already existing (art. 20), though "international en-
gagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understand-
ings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of
peace" are expressly stated to be consistent with the Covenant
(art. 21). To assure necessary adaptation to new conditions and
to avoid a perpetuation of the status quo the assembly is author-
ized to "advise the reconsideration by members of the league of
treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of
international conditions whose continuance might endanger the
peace of the world" (art. 19). The instrumentalities set up by the
League for the giving of technical advice and for periodic dis-
cussion with representatives of other nations will greatly facili-
tate the making of treaties of permanent benefit. In fact, by the
Covenant itself, the members agree to work for treaties improving
labor conditions, reducing armaments, preventing disease, secur-
ing freedom of communication and transit, equitable treatment
for commerce, etc., (arts. 8, 23).
Transfers of territory, heretofore, have been in theory matters
of concern only to the ceding and acquiring state.7 s In practice
76Hall, op. cit. p. 365. Supra note 19.
77Supra note 20.
78Hall, op. cit. pp. 46-48.
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the interest of the inhabitants has sometimes been recognized9
and this interest was recognized in the peace conference which ingeneral based its allocations of territory on the principle of selfdetermination.s" Plebiscites were provided in several doubtful
regionss' The League of Nations Covenant recognizes that inclass A mandates "the wishes of these communities must be aprincipal consideration in the selection of the mandatory" (art.
22).
In practice the interest of neighboring states has also been areal influence in limiting the power of states to cede or acquireterritory. Thus the United States has forbidden transfers in theNew World except to her 2 and this "regional understanding"
aspect of the Monroe Doctrine is recognized in the Covenant(art. 21).
Finally the interest of the family of nations as a whole, inpreventing transfers by conquest, which has been growing inrecognition for a hundred years, 3 has been stated as law in article10 of the Covenant by which the members "undertake to respect
and preserve as against external aggression" each other's terri-torial integrity. The family of nations, however, has an equal in-terest in preventing the perpetuation of an undesirable status quo.This interest in change is given recognition by a declaration thatit is "the friendly right of each member of the League to bringto the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circum-stance whatever affecting international relations which threatensto disturb international peace or the good understanding between
nations upon which peace depends." (art. 11), and by authoritygiven to the Assembly "from time to time to advise the recon-
sideration by members of the League of treaties which have be-
come inapplicable and the consideration of international condi-tions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world"(art. 19). Thus it appears that a definite international law of real
79Ibid., and Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites, N. Y. 1920,p. xxvii.
80Supra note 53.
slSupra note 54.82See Pres. Polk's message on Yucatan, April 29, 1848; Pres. Grant'smessage on St. Domingo, May 31, 1870; Senate Resolution suggested byMagdalena Bay incident Aug. 2, 1912, conveniently collected in A Leagueof Nations, vol. 1, No. 5 (June 1918). See also decision of CentralAmerican Court of Justice on Gulf of Fonseca case, 11 Am. Journ. nt.Law, 676, 730, (July 1917).83Wright, 13 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., 558-559; Resolution of Pan-AmericanCongress, 1890, Moore, Digest 1: 292; Cobbett, op. cit. 2: 245.
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estate is developing which will substitute legal title and peaceable
transfer, subject to an advisory international eminent domain, for
conquest and holding by force.
The war and peace have tended to increase the importance
of express agreement as a source of international law and to
emphasize the need of definite organization for its sanction. With
reference to the principles of the law itself certain tendencies, still
rather indefinite, are suggested by the foregoing inquiry. From
a subjective standpoint international law tends to recognize that
the enjoyment of sovereignty is conditioned by the assumption of
responsibility for the maintenance of law. Viewed from an ob-
jective standpoint it tends to recognize a greater number of con-
crete limitations upon the jurisdiction of states over their terri-
tory and nationals out of consideration for the rights of minori-
ties, freedom of transit and equality of economic opportunity.
Viewed from the standpoint of international intercourse, while
according to states almost complete liberty to settle controversies,
establish permanent international regulations and transfer terri-
tory by peaceful means, international law tends more definitely
to discountenance the conduct of such transactions by violence.
(To be continued.)
